RPA Communications Audit Analysis

RPA exists in a research to testimony coalition model, which helps to build expert consensus and regulatory credibility. However, this approach faces structural difficulty when it comes to rapid political crisis or defending policies against public facing opposition framing. This audit exists as a first part to a broader analysis of effective environmental policy advocacy. It reveals 3 key findings about distinct communication patterns the RPA utilizes, that will be developed later in this report. The first is slow expert-channel engagement on complex policies. The second is rapid deployment to public facing media during moments of political opportunity. Finally, a third pattern of near total silence during implementation phases. The overall area for improvement stems from RPA winning policies very successfully, but a dual struggle to maintain public attention to them. I hypothesize that this is a part of a larger distancing of the public from focus on environmental issues, as the narrative around environmental policymaking has shifted quite dramatically. However, for the sake of the internal audit I will focus more primarily on the RPA and its direct sphere of influence, tackling the broader context in the next part of this report

The process for collecting and assessing this data is key to being able to accurately understand the story of RPA communications around these policies. I began with a comprehensive assessment of the RPA website, as that was the heart of the communications from RPA. This involved scraping the website for each publication about one of the six policies I was looking at, and then within each publication clipping the text from each that discussed relevant material. After compiling that, I then did a comprehensive review of our social media accounts, looking at linkedin, twitter, and bluesky. For this review, I again used keyword searches and media scraping to find any mention of one of the six policies, compiled that text, as well as the frequency of the post. Finally, I looked at our internal document that stores every news clip the RPA is mentioned in, and once again repeated the process of finding every clip that mentioned one of the six policies and compiling that data. There are two data collection spaces that have resulted from this work, which will be linked in the appendix of this paper. The first is a large document that has all of the textual data, such as how the policy is mentioned on any of these platforms. The other is an excel spreadsheet, which has uniform data points (such as frequency, date, title, and a link to where it was originally sourced) about each of the policies as well as their presence on social platforms. The data is labeled as ​‘appearances’ in this paper for the sake of simplicity, but the sources can be found within these documents. This data is the basis for which the analysis rests on.

QUESTION 1

How does RPA Communicate about these policies?

The communication stack: RPA deploys six primary content types, mentioned by order of frequency on either the RPA website or on broader social media platforms.

1. Testimony. Testimony makes up 36% of the total output across all policies. This includes addresses to regulatory agencies and legislative committees, and often the language is highly technical and policy compliant. Testimony serves two primary functions for RPA. The first is building credibility with government agencies and officials, as it serves as an official reference point for most policy debates. The second is creating an official record of RPA’s position, that can be looked back to for future reference, and serves as a critical timestamp. Examples of this in action are REAL rule comments (two appearances) and SEQRA testimony in committees (five appearances). Testimony does provide the key strength of creating legitimacy for decision makers, as well as a credibility function that is bolstered by RPA’s reputation. However, the main weakness here is that it is largely invisible to the general public.

2. News releases. News releases make up 28% of RPAs total output across all policies. These are defined by concentrated campaigns whereby RPA decided to ​“go public” with their information. This often involves a coordinated effort with coalition partners, and generally follows three temporal patterns. The first is a victory statement following a policy win. The second is a crisis response, for when policy or the environment in general, is under attack. The last is a more general coalition announcement, with the purpose of amplifying reach beyond the smaller RPA environment. Examples of this include the SEQRA reform campaign (six news releases in 2026 alone) and the offshore wind response this year. The strength of this strategy is that it can reach far broader audiences through noble forms of earned media, and bolstered trust and action with our coalition’s bases as well. However, the weakness here isn’t in the strategy itself, but rather that RPA underutilizes it. RPA tends to produce fewer news releases than the volume of their expert work would justify, leaving a gap in action that could take RPA’s policy influence even further.

3. RPA Lab Posts. Lab Posts make up 17% of RPA’s total output. This is defined by the internal research communication platform that RPA utilizes. It serves as a great bridge between expert analysis from RPA and the educated public audience, through translating policy into themed essays and data visualizations. The primary audience here are civic professionals, local officials, and informed advocates. Examples of this in practice are the CLCPA grid analysis done in 2025, as well as the SEQRA land conservation benefits in 2026. This type of output provides the strong benefit of allowing nuanced explanations of complex topics. However, it falls short in how it only typically reaches people already interested in RPA’s work.

4. Coalition Leadership. This is responsible for 14% of RPAs output. RPA co-founds or co-leads multiple stakeholder coalitions which is a very strong part of RPAs core mission. These provide research, messaging infrastructure, and just broader credibility to RPA. The main benefit in terms of public reach here too is that coalition members amplify RPA’s message through their own channels. Examples of this include the Unlock NY’s future coalition on SEQRA (30+ organizations participating) as well as NY Renews on the CLCPA. The strength here lies in the multiplication of RPA’s reach, without increasing RPA’s own communication burden. The main issue here is the limiting action particularly in crisis moments, as it takes awhile to bolster support and build a coalition especially if the issue is highly divisive.

5. Events. Events make up 4% of the output from RPA on recent policies. These include webinars, panel discussions, and town halls. It usually is timed to policy moments such as post-passage or post-implementation, and includes a mix of expert audience and interested public. Examples of this are the Westchester SEQRA webinar from June 2026 with Open New York. The strength of events is most obviously the direct dialogue with stakeholders, but the weakness here is the limited scale and audience these have.

6. Reports. Reports make up only 1% of the policy output for recent policies. However, this is likely due to the fact that reports are not the critical focus for active policy campaigns, rather serve as a strong jumping off point and a broader context that can be utilized when needed. These are the foundational research providers, such as the fourth regional plan. Reports are critical to RPA and don’t really have strict strengths or weaknesses, rather it’s just important to note how RPA chooses speed over long report writing when it comes to dealing with policy crises.

QUESTION 2

What is effective for the public?

First it is important to look at what worked well for the RPA in the public sphere. The most public facing success that RPA has had to date is the SEQRA reform campaign of 2026. This is the clearest example I found of RPA operating at its best for the most audiences. But it is important to dive into why. First, the RPA utilized a critical strategy of translation to public language. It moved from technical bill legal language (“Type 2 exemptions from previously disturbed sites”) to narrative language (“one person is allowed to block what your whole community wants”). Further, the RPA utilized more personified language of the law here (“SEQRA just turned 50 and it is not aging well”). Finally, it named villains (wealthy opponents blocking housing) and victims (families paying rent, communities waiting for senior housing), drawing clear lines for the public. Also, it used multiple channels simultaneously. This included Op-eds in local news (LoHud), which reached suburban homeowners and state legislatures who don’t follow RPA. They also distributed news releases to the statewide coalition, giving 30+ organizations a unified message to amplify. Further, RPA utilized social media strongly (linkedin, bluesky), which kept momentum visible between major announcements. Finally, webinars were also used (Westchester, a Hybrid event) to engage local officials and residents. The next communication strategy that made SEQRA action successful was making polling public. Instead of keeping survey data private, RPA cited polling openly (“78% of voters call utility bills a major problem”). This works because it converts abstract support into political fact, and tells wavering legislators that backing this policy action is what the public wants. Further, RPA successfully built coalition infrastructure around SEQRA. ​“Unlock NY’s Future” gave the campaign a distinct brand, not just RPA’s name. Coalition members could use this framing without explaining who RPA is, and quotes from coalition partners (such as housing groups, transit advocates, and environmental organizations) showed this wasn’t just a one issue push. Finally, the last successful strategy RPA utilized here was celebrating publicly and naming decision makers. By putting out a final statement that thanked Governor Hochul, Mayor Zohran Mamdani, and legislative leaders by name, it rewards politicians for taking risks and signals they should expect public credit, bolstering long term support connections. The result of this comprehensive strategy was SEQRA’s passage in the FY2027 budget after years of technical work. This public facing campaign truly was part of the difference maker.

Another major successful campaign for RPA communication was the CLCPA implementation (2019-2022), before the 2026 rollback. The success here largely first came from the multi-sector framing, which showed how the CLCPA affected transportation, buildings, energy, and natural resources, rather than a broader ​“the environment” framing. It also drew strength from equity emphasis, whereby almost every RPA piece for the CLCPA connected in some way to disadvantaged communities and environmental justice. The CLCPA strategy also emphasised concrete projects, which showcased specific implementation examples (Sandy10 resilience maps, Tier 4 transmission, Five Borough Bikeway) to make the law a tangible thing the public would see. Finally, RPA successfully implemented local activation, whereby they developed the Developed Climate Action Manual for Central Queens, and showed how a statewide law works on the ground. This push worked because people could see themselves in the implementation of the CLCPA, with tangible effects on their neighborhood, transportation, or heating system. This being said though, any mention of CLCPA was included in the data here, but from a purely qualitative perspective, most of the CLCPA bucket was using the CLCPA as a goal setting benchmark and reminder, not an advocacy for the law. This still worked to keep the public attached to the CLCPA, but stronger advocacy could be used.

However, RPA has also faced challenges with communication around environmental policy as well. The most glaring RPA struggle was with the CLCPA defense in 2025 and 2026. When the CLCPA came under attack in 2025-2026, RPA’s communication initially struggled to positively frame the CLCPA against opposition. The opposition was very quickly able to turn the narrative on the CLCPA, utilizing messaging like ​“This law will raise your energy bills”, a simple, visceral, and personal language that connects to salient public concerns. RPA’s message was disconnected here (“CLCPA mandates 40% GHG reduction by 2030 and 85% by 2050”) which is technical, abstract, and defensive instead. The research shows that pocketbook frames beat regulatory frames almost every time in terms of public persuasion. RPA fell short here, spending years explaining the requirements of the CLCPA, but never spending years explaining to people what happens to real people if it weakens. Next, RPA struggled by speaking in policy language where they needed storied language instead. Pretty much every RPA piece on the CLCPA used regulatory or technical language, and none had a narrative arc of protagonist, threat, obstacle, and turning point. The comparison here is as the congestion pricing letter to the governor (whereby advocates and civic coalitions sent letters to Governor Hochul mentioning that her temporary suspension regarding congestion pricing directly conflicted with the mandates of the CLCPA) came closer it named threats and called for action, but it was written to decision makers and not to the public. RPA also struggled with making personal connections to the benefits of the CLCPA, and instead often utilized it more as a stagnant benchmark. RPA described the CLCPA in terms of targets and timelines, but realistically the public doesn’t feel targets or timelines. Rather, they feel tangible impacts such as their basement flooding after a storm, their ConEd bill going up, or their kids’ asthma in the summer. The RPA Sandy10 resilience map was a step in the right direction for RPA, but it was still framed as a planning tool rather than messaged as ​“here’s what happens to your block”. The opposition advantage here is that they made it personal immediately, using quick phrases like ​“your bills will go up”. Further, RPA was invisible when it mattered most. In the FY2027 budget fight, which was the critical moment that the CLCPA was actually weakened, there was only one news release from RPA and the focus was more on offshore wind. Meanwhile other groups were actively condemning the changes, such as the Sierra Club. Further NRDC issued language of ​“Deep disappointment” in their statement, and NY Renews mobilized 300+ organizations. Part of this makes sense as RPA is set up as a research and testimony organization, however there are steps in the right direction that RPA can utilize that can help support public pressure mounted by other groups. Finally, RPA did not build a public constituency on the CLCPA over time. The CLCPA passed in 2019 with massive grassroots support from NY Renews. Through 2019 and 2026, RPA produced 23 pieces of CLCPA communication, but all of this was largely expert-to-expert or expert-to-government. Almost none of these were designed to maintain and grow public attachment to the law, letting it escape the public mind.

Another example of a struggle RPA faced in communicating with the public was in the REAL Rule Delay (January-May 2026). When New Jersey’s REAL Rule was adopted, immediately paused, then delayed a full year, RPA lacked any meaningful public facing communication at any of the key turning points. There was no statement from RPA welcoming adoption, no public pressure mounted during the delay, and no response to the one year postponement. This matters because the rule was largely technically sound and supported by the RPA, but was administratively fragile depending on the governor to leave office, vulnerable to regulatory review, and strongly opposed by industry groups. The missing link of support here was a public that knew it existed and cared whether it survived, but instead industry groups lobbied regulators, RPA filed comment letters, and the rule eroded quickly over the heads of the public. The key takeaway here is that this is where public communication matters most, not in popular bills moving through legislatures, but in complex rules being slowly unwound in administrative processes that most people never see.

QUESTION 3

What are the struggles from the Public Mind?

This section dives into what the public doesn’t understand about RPA’s policy areas. Often, the issues RPA has faced has fallen within this gap between RPA knowledge and the public mind, so closing that gap is critical to communication success. First, the public seems to lack understanding of why these rules matter to them personally. Looking at the CLCPA, the public has a hard time connecting the language of 85% emissions reduction by 2050 to their life. A large sum of the public does not connect this to net zero economies meaning different heating, cars, and power sources. The public does not think about the CLCPA when ConEd bills arrive, rather looking at the high prices and evaluating logically based on reactions those numbers cause. They don’t associate climate law with tangible impacts like basements flooding of kids’ asthma levels, distancing the public mind from these higher goals RPA has. Further, as these non-climate pressures heighten, the capacity in the minds of the public lessens for things they cannot connect to bettering their day to day. SEQRA can also be used as an example of this mismatch. When the public hears ​“the environmental review act” they associate this with something good that is protecting the environment. What they don’t see here is the nuance that has tangible impacts on their life, because the messaging isn’t there. For example, this modification could prevent someone from blocking a daycare for 3+ years, or help lower the cost of rent. There’s a gap here where the public is not connecting SEQRA delays to the housing costs people actually pay. One thing RPA did well here was translating ​“one opponent halts progress, frustrating communities that have worked for years”, which shows the tangible human cost to populations. A final example of this is in the REAL rule. Again, the public does not know that 98% of New Jersey’s coast faces medium or very high sea level rise risk, and that homes are still able to be built in foreseeable floodzones without the REAL rule. There is this huge gap of regulation language to concrete examples that the RPA could fill, illuminating more lasting solutions for the public. For example, RPA could map the rule onto actual neighborhoods, showing residents of Hoboken, Atlantic City, and Cape May what this would actually mean to them.

The public also fails to understand why these policies are worth the cost. Right now in particular, the affordability anxiety is highly salient. The opposition’s message of ​“they will raise your bills” strikes fear into what could excite supporters of policy change. This is because the public hears an immediate, personal, tangible cost from these opponents, but RPA’s answer is complex, defensive, and abstract. This looks like the following from the RPA ​“yes, some short term transition costs. No they’re not as large as they claimed. Yes, fossil fuel price volatility costs more over time. Yes, health costs are enormous but invisible”. The differences from opponents are real. Not only does RPA get put on the defensive with this kind of messaging, but the lack of simplicity struggles to stick in the public mind at all. The honest argument RPA could make in simple terms would be ​“renewable energy costs less over time”. ​“Pollution costs you this much in health expenses right now”. ​“Delaying action costs more later”. These messages would need substantial resources to back up the claims being made, but research is the core of RPA’s skill set and would be a worthy investment to make these pocketbook phrases stick in the minds of the public better. The gap here that RPA needs to close is that the opponents of this like Governor Hochul cite ​“affordability” RPA needs to be able to come back as much as possible with a similar tangible outcome members of the public can connect with and rally behind.

The public also struggles with a concept of trust but not enough trust. RPA is not short for credibility in any sense, but this credibility is narrow. The public reads RPA as credible with experts, policymakers, and planners. However, the public does not read RPA as fully credible for regular people, people in neighborhoods, and people facing sharp bills. This is largely because RPA’s voice is largely institutional, expert focused, and measured, which is exactly what’s needed in testimony, but isn’t the thing that gets the public moving. For example, when RPA says ​“SEQRA reform does not mean weakening environmental review” that’s legally and technically super important. But to environmentalists worried about rollbacks (and rightfully so) it’s not going to be reassuring enough, and to the general public getting their news from small headlines it’s largely invisible. Therefore, there’s this trust gap. Environmental justice communities most affected by SEQRA delays and environmental harm need to hear from neighbors and trusted communities resources. This could be a key strategy from the RPA to work with local groups in these areas to build that trust brick by brick.

Further, the public interprets silence as abandonment. For example, we can look first to the CLCPA. The public was mobilized to pass the CLCPA in 2019 through NY renews, focusing on grassroots organizing. Then, for six years after its passage, the public heard silence from expert analysis. When the law came under attack, the public was not ready in their minds to defend it, as it wasn’t familiar anymore. The public came to the conclusion subconsciously that because the RPA wasn’t making noise about this, maybe its urgency wasn’t truly high. This is similar to politicians, whereby when they are silent on an issue, it signals lack of urgency and care for said issue. REAL Rule is another good example of this. The rule was adopted in January 2026, but had no announcement from RPA. The rule was then paused in January 2026 with no public alarm from RPA. Then the rule was delayed May 2026, and there was no public response from RPA. The public looks to groups like RPA for cues about what the salient issues are in the environmental space. It functions as a trust relationship, where the public that can’t be monitoring policy all the time trusts the RPA (and its then more grassroots organizations) to signal when they need to be up in arms about an issue.

Finally, the public mind is hard to reach because of information overload with no clear priority. For example, looking at the CLCPA policy landscape, there were 23 pieces of communication over seven years. These topics varied a lot, from regulatory deadlines, sector implementation, or specific programs. However, there was never a critical signal that there was a moment that mattered most. Public attention is highly finite, and without clear prioritization, all pieces get treated equally. As a result, the public could not distinguish between major rollback and routine regulatory delay.

QUESTION 4

Recommendations for RPA

Recommendations will focus on short term tactical solutions that could be implemented over the next 6-12 months. First, RPA should work to develop a public benefits counter narrative for each law. The focus should not just be on ​“the law requires X reduction by 2030”, but rather ​“weakening this law will cost queens household $X in flood damage over 10 years, your ConEd will be $Y higher, projections for what percentage more childhood asthma cases will increase”. This is a language restructuring that would help to make concrete connections to the public mind. The action here would be partnering with health researchers, economists, and community groups to translate targets into neighborhood specific impacts. The timeline here would look like building this for CLCPA defense now as it is still under threat, but finish before the 2027 budget fight.

The second short term recommendation is to increase communication cadence during political crises. The 2025-2026 budget fight warranted more frequent, more urgent communication than normal years. A reactive news release after the fact does not equal proactive messaging during negotiations. The action here would be that when a policy enters active threat phase, the RPA needs to increase communication from quarterly or annually to almost weekly or even daily. For example, the SEQRA campaign accelerated dramatically in 2026 because they knew the budget window was closing. This could apply to CLCPA defense (ongoing), RAPID Act implementation (2026-2027), and offshore wind defense (2026-2027).

Next, RPA could add content types for broader audiences. The current stack RPA follows is Reports then testimony then RPA lab, which is wonderful but all expert facing. What it is missing is short explainers, op-eds, data visualizations, social media ready graphics, and video explanation at a higher scale. The action here would be to invest in people creating communications deliverables. RPA could develop a template ​“explainer graphic” and it could be customized to each policy launch and development. Also, data trends are showing an increase in preference for short form media, so launching capacity in building these types of media is critical. Further, writing monthly op-eds for Daily News and New York Post (which outer borough swing voters read) would help to reach people beyond what internal channels already cover. This would be slightly more costly in terms of being a higher creative demand for output from the RPA.

Another short term strategy for the RPA would be to simplify the core message. Again, the opposition is able to take down the work RPA does with quick three word, repeatable, and visceral messaging like ​“lower your bills”. RPA however is often on the side of multi-clause, technical, and defensive writing. The action here would be to distill each policy to one to two core public messages that are true, personal, urgent (time bound), and simple. For example for the CLCPA the messaging could be ​“Pollution is expensive, clean energy is cheaper” or ​“your health costs more than renewable energy ever will”. For SEQRA something like ​“One person shouldn’t be able to block housing your neighborhood needs” and for the REAL rule it could look like ​“don’t build homes in tomorrow’s flood zones”. Having these simplified messages that are personal to the people but then can also be backed by extensive RPA reporting is the true key to success here in the public mind.

The final short term recommendation for RPA is mapping stakeholder amplification channels. RPA’s testimony represents RPA, but NY renews could be amplified if given the research and framing. Environmental justice groups in vulnerable communities need tools to make CLCPA real for their constituents. So, the RPA could create ​“RPA Briefs for Coalition Partners”, which would be a one-pager of distilled research, core messaging, and social media graphics. This could be publicly available, but specifically designed for organizations to adapt and use. Then, monthly calls with coalition partners could be used to coordinate messages and identify any outstanding information gaps.

Medium term recommendations look like roughly one to two years of work for the RPA. First, RPA needs to separate defense from explanation, via different communication channels. RPA currently uses the same channels (testimony, lab posts) for both defending existing laws and explaining how to implement them. These need different strategies. For defense mode where the policy is under attack, RPA should use a higher cadence, higher urgency, and be more public facing. They could partner with grassroots organizations to generate constituent pressure, use news releases as primary tools, simplify messages and accept nuance won’t really survive this battle. For example, these strategies could be applied to CLCPA 2025-2026. For implementation mode where the policy is passed and now is being executed, RPA can focus on technical depth and be more expert, looking at regulatory comment letters, stakeholder coordination, and technical reporting. Further, they can use lab posts and testimony as the primary tools here, explaining nuance and prioritizing detail. An application would be SEQRA modernization post passage (2026-2027). The current gap is just that RPA doesn’t distinguish these modes, so they either oversimplify at the wrong moment (losing expert credibility) or overcomplicate when defending (losing the public).

Further, RPA should work to build durable public attachment, not just reactive campaigns. The CLCPA shows that a policy can win with massive grassroots support (2019) then slowly erode over six years while experts defend it in quiet channels (2019-2026), then collapse when ordinary people don’t know why it matters. The action here is to launch an annual public education campaign (“heres what the CLCPA means for your neighborhood this year”) and produce annual reports in public facing formats (non-academic), this could be something like ​“How we are progressing on our climate goals”. For example, when I was interning in Australia, the NGO had me compile a one-pager on how NSW was doing on their 30 by 30 targets, which were a series of climate action goals directed at reducing GHG emissions and promoting conservation. RPA could also commission story telling projects, where local residents could explain how climate policy affects their lives (video, podcast, photo essay). This works because it’s not something that requires constant activism from the public, but just requires passive familiarity. When the attack comes, the public then would already have an existing relationship with the policy.

To continue, RPA also needs to work to clarify the role of RPA vs. the role of other partners. RPA credibility and influence comes from being non-partisan, evidence based, and expert. The moment RPA starts running grassroots campaigns, it risks that reputation. Evidence shows expert credibility alone does not protect policy from actual political attack. RPA could instead reframe the strategic tension. RPA’s role is clarified then as research, testimony, credibility, expert consensus, and the coalition partners roles are public mobilization, community organizing, and grassroots pressure. The change here is in the nuance, whereby RPA invests more explicitly in enabling partners who do what RPA can’t. Thus, RPA can provide top quality research, talking points, data, simple messages, and coalition infrastructure, without providing grassroots campaign management that other partners specialize in. An example of this working is the SEQRA campaign, whereby RPA provided research, coalition structure, and expert credibility, and Open New York and housing groups mobilized their constituencies.

The last medium term strategy would be implementing real time monitoring of strategy during policy fights. The REAL rule was delayed multiple times with RPA silent at each turning point. This happens because RPA doesn’t have a system to track turning points and trigger communications. The action here would be assigning someone to monitor regulatory and legislative calendars for each priority policy and define communication trigger points in advance. So, when a policy passes there should be a victory statement within 24 hours, if a policy is under attack an initial response within 48, implementation delays should have a public statement within a week, and when comment periods open, urge coalition members to file within the first week. This works because most of RPA’s communication delays come from slow institutional processes (approval chains, author review) so pre planning removes these bottlenecks.

Finally, long term structural recommendations look at the breadth of RPA and how that explicitly can be strategized to see energy and environment policy benefits. RPA communication is research backed, technically sound, and by design institutional. This works for policymakers but doesn’t build grassroots attachment to policies that are needed for them to survive. The action step here is to partner with local media outlets serving communities most affected by RPAs policies. This could look like Spanish language radio and TV in EJ neighborhoods, Caribbean or immigrant community media in coastal areas, and south asian media in areas affected by Bronx infrastructure projects. The RPA could then commission these outlets to cover RPA research in language and frames these communities understand, and could be a tool to co-develop fact sheets and explainers designed for community distribution. Mainstream media already covers RPA reports, but the people most often affected get information through different channels, and this would fill that gap.

The next long term goal for RPA would be to create a ​“RPA for ordinary people” content line (with a better title). All RPA research gets at least one public translation, whereby a complex technical report could have a two page plain language summary, academic policy analysis could have a 90 second video explanation, and regulatory testimony could have a social media graphic with key insight. The development of a template here would also streamline this work. This would help remove that step where complex ideas die because they never get simplified.

My final recommendation for RPA is to build predictive communication for implementation risk. After CLCPA won, implementation took 6+ years and then got rolled back. After SEQRA passed, implementation now enters a regulatory process where the rule could be watered down quietly. The action here would be that for each policy RPA wins, immediately create an implementation defense roadmap. This would work to identify where the policy could be undermined, when, by whom, and what does success look like? It’s a way to mitigate risks by preplanning comms strategy for each risk point, and by bringing in coalition members to this too, they can build complementary strategies ahead of time. For example, for SEQRA the risk points were regulatory agencies write overly narrow exemptions, developers exploit loopholes, and one high profile project challenges and wins spreading precedent, but RPA could come in and already have a plan for how to respond to these things, when, and who to partner with, making them less likely to go unnoticed.

While the first part of this report started by examining Regional Plan Association’s internal communication strategy around New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) and State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and New Jersey’s Resilient Environments and Landscapes (REAL) rule, part 2 asks a debatably harder question: When multiple organizations communicate about the same policy, whose message moves the politicians and the public mind? And why? In part 1 we saw that RPA’s role differed by policy, being a supporting player in the CLCPA battle, a leading member of the SEQRA coalition, and an observer and supporting player of REAL rule adoption. This external audit goes beyond RPA however, and examines what the groups who won those fights, and those that found themselves on the losing side, can teach us about effective policy communication. This section illuminates two key findings: winning coalitions share specific communication tactics, and losing coalitions often repeat the same mistakes across different policy battles. If we look at other environmental and advocacy groups and how they communicated about these policies, what can we learn about what actually moves policy?

FINDING 1

Coalition breadth wins passage, whereas coalition durability loses defense. The success of grassroots coalitions that led to the passage of the CLCPA in 2019 illuminates this finding.

In 2019, New York Renews, a coalition of 300+ environmental justice groups (WE ACT, PUSH Buffalo), labor, environmental organizations, faith based groups, and community groups, won CLCPA passage by leveraging the diversity of member organizations across a large sector of the public sphere. Using this breadth of a coalition, members used grassroots organizing, door knocking, and rallies, alongside legislative advocacy and strong media coverage to shape the public mind at a large scale. The key to this unification was their messaging that could align large swaths of different interests, using climate justice, funding to disadvantaged communities, and job production talking points to align groups that have previously stood in opposition to each other. The diversity of the New York Renews coalition breadth made sure that every demographic heard from a trusted messenger of their community, with a huge boost in authenticity and relatability because Environmental Justice (EJ) groups were leading this conversation. Coupled with how salient the climate crisis was at the time, and the assistance of a democratic legislature, the public was ripe to act in support of the CLCPA.

However, in 2026, we saw that this same coalition could not defend the CLCPA, a puzzling flip of the narrative. The coalition was unable to build the same energy that existed in 2019. The timing of simultaneous policy threats proved strategically damaging to coalition cohesion. When the CLCPA came under attack at the same moment as SEQRA reform was being debated, the environmental movement faced a choice about where to focus limited resources and attention. Organizations that had been prepared to fight for SEQRA reform found themselves pulled away to defend the CLCPA instead, a fight they saw as existential. As one coalition partner noted, nearly the entire environmental movement pivoted to defending the climate law, leaving SEQRA with limited external coalition support. This timing, whether intentional or not, significantly weakened the ability of any single organization to mount a robust campaign. Had SEQRA been fought in isolation, the coalition likely would have had the bandwidth for the sustained, multifaceted campaign it needed. The public operated at a high rate of mobilization in 2019, and then for six years after it passed it was radio silence from our top experts. This once strong coalition had lost the offensive momentum, and on the defense the coalition began to fracture. As labor became more salient, members of the once large and diverse coalition moved to support Hochul’s actions, siding with her claims of affordability.

Comparing this to SEQRA however, we can further parse how pro-reform coalitions can stay together over years. With SEQRA, Open NY built a 40 organization coalition that was pro-reform, drawing from housing bases, some environmental groups, and RPA. The environmental groups that were opposed to SEQRA reform were highly fragmented here, and there was no cross-sector alliance, which benefited the coalition in being able to cover large swaths of the public and look strong to the political actors. By pulling together a coalition that spanned housing, environmental reform, transit, community development, business, civic organizations and EJ groups, the breadth of this offensive coalition was hard to contend with. Further, the pro-reform coalition had a clear political champion here as well in Mayor Mamdani. The opposition stood very little chance next to this strong showing. But, to CLCPA’s credit, the SEQRA fight only needed to hold together for a 4 month budget fight, whereas CLCPA needed a coalition to hold together over 6 years.

The first lesson for RPA that can be gleaned from this storyline is that passage puts you on the offensive, which is exciting, energizing, and brings new people in. This is an exciting time to get in on the fight. The defense however is exhausting, requires sustained attention, and faces an uphill battle of the exhaustion people get with the same ideas leading to message fatigue. This illuminates a key vulnerability here in the environmental policy space whereby when there is coalition fatigue, plus fragmentation during the implementation phase, there is strong vulnerability to attack from opposition leaders. A key example of this is the Watershed Institute’s (a water focused nonprofit) email campaigns around the REAL Rules, whereby engagement in the first was strong and large, the second even bigger, but then by the third it dropped off (Pisauro interview). This narrative illustrates that coalition building for passage is not the same as coalition building for defense, and the work and commitment structures must adapt to prevent opposition takeover in each step.

FINDING 2

Second, polling data as a political permission beats narrative appeals alone. For example, with Open NY, polling was used as a political weapon to achieve a large deal of success with SEQRA. Open NY commissioned a citywide poll on environmental review reform, and found that 81% citywide support existed for SEQRA reform (Berkowitz interview). Further, in areas assumed to oppose this reform (like Queens and Staten Island suburbs), through polling they actually found that ​“no part of any policy was underwater anywhere”(Berkowitz). This dramatically illuminated that the loudest voices were often coming from the most active constituents, but those voices did not represent the desires of a majority of the population. They found that ​“who you’re hearing from at community meetings” is not representative of what the whole constituency thinks, especially in localities. By using the polling data and releasing it strategically, it became THE political fact used to justify reform to legislators. Finally, legislators could tell constituents that a majority was on their side, and that the opposition really was an outlier to this discussion.

Environmental groups here largely had a failed counter narrative when looking at this issue. Their messaging was largely around a false choice between housing and the environment, yet did no counterpolling to show extreme public disagreement. For example, Citizens Campaign for the Environment relied on this idea that ​“they reject the whole premise that area is the reason we don’t have affordable housing”. This strategy failed because it did not show legislators that opposition voters actually wanted SEQRA, they just asserted it. That gave the polling advantage to the reformers, leading to the ending of the opposition narrative’s success.

There is a paradox that exists here with the CLCPA. Polling done by NY renews and Global Strategy Group (GSG) before 2026 showed that 64% of NY constituents supported the CLCPA and that with further explanation 72% supported it. However, May 2026 polling showed that 67% were concerned about cost of living and that 36% said Albany spends too little on programs and wants more investments. The public wanted more government investment, not less, but Hochul framed CLCPA as the cost problem, not the solution. Earthjustice, an environmental law firm leading the CLCPA fight, mentioned that ​“Pocketbook frames beat regulatory frames almost every time in terms of public persuasion”(Rachel Spector), which rings true in this and many other examples. Polling showed support was there, but political will was the real barrier, not public opinion.

Further, with the REAL Rule we saw a lack of this polling existing. There was little support or opposition research into this. However, 885 public comments were submitted during the comment period, a prime source for public opinion that was largely not looked into (Cole Schotz). The result of this was that the industry opposition framing of ​“costs” ​“complexity” and ​“regulation creep” circulated and was unchallenged by public opinion data. The implication of this is that environmental groups knew the public might support REAL, but they just didn’t invest in proving it publicly.

The lessons for RPA are clear here, with the apparent key being that numbers create political permission, but narrative alone does not. Polling is not just about research, it’s a political weapon, and releasing public polling publicly signals that an issue is not just the opinion of the select few, but that it’s what voters want. Further, withholding polling signals that there is a lack of public support, even when the public may be largely in favor of it. A potential application here for RPA would be to commission polling for major policy campaigns as part of their amazing reporting feature, to answer what will move decision makers.

FINDING 3

The third finding of this report is that the opposition frames policy when groups cede the frame. The first example of this is with SEQRA, where the coalitions RPA was a part of and Governor Hochul were able to dominate the frame quickly. With Hochul’s ​“let them build” announcement (January, 2023) words like ​“cutting red tape” ​“housing affordability” and ​“common sense reforms” were simple and digestible for the public. In her announcement, Hochul made a statement saying ​“Red tape and duplicative reviews have stopped New York from doing the very building that made us the envy of the world, making housing more expensive and infrastructure outdated—that ends today”. The power of this framing lay not just in its simplicity, but in its emotional resonance. The ​“let them build” language wrapped a deregulatory agenda in the language of economic justice and affordability, messages that were intuitively appealing but, according to environmental advocates involved in the fight, fundamentally disconnected from the actual impacts of the policy. This created a challenging dynamic where the coalition understood the nuanced environmental and procedural implications of the proposal, but the public discourse had already been shaped by a much simpler narrative. Advocates were forced to work significantly harder to communicate their alternative framing, knowing they were competing against a message that, while not technically accurate, was far more emotionally compelling and broadly accessible.

With early action from the pro-reform coalition beginning late December 2025 and into January 2026, there was strong framing already in place, leaving the environmental opposition groups to largely react in March. Using the platform Hochul has as Governor, this message was able to be amplified while traveling throughout the state. There is a clear tactical advantage here announcing before opposition could coordinate, and then continuing to amplify the message to a breadth of constituents while the opposition was largely focused on protesting at the capitol. Additionally, there was a physical separation whereby the Governor was not present to hear the protests, so the messaging stayed largely at the capitol whereas the affordability messaging traveled around the state. This initial framing provided a key advantage from the jump.

Diving into the opposition’s reactive framing a bit more, it is important to understand why their messaging took the backburner and was ultimately unsuccessful. For example, Sierra Club messaging centered around how environmental review was not the primary reason for housing delays. Citizens Campaign similarly rejected the premise that SEQRA was the reason there is not affordable housing. Save the Sound corroborated this, calling the exemptions overly broad and could result in water pollution, flooding, and erosion. All of these were responses to the framing the coalition had already set up, not an attempt to initiate a new frame. By defending on an existing frame, groups accepted that those were the rules for legitimate debate. Mr. Berkowitz exemplifies this perfectly ​“when you respond directly to charges and attacks about a policy, chances are you’re not going to win”, because you’re accepting that as the frame for the argument to take place on.

Looking at policy we can further illuminate this lesson. First, with the CLCPA, affordability became common sense. Hochul in 2026 was able to frame that the delays to the law were just more time to prevent ​“cost impacts of more than 4,100 annually”, numbers based on NYSERDA calculations, giving Hochul credibility and the ability to say that the CLCPA will raise bills. Environmental groups came back with complex responses, using regulatory analysis and less tangible evidence that did not connect as much with people. Part 1 dives into this more, but overall the opposition used present tense personal language whereas the defenders were using future tense abstract language. The result was that ​“pocketbook frames beat regulatory frames almost every time”(Spector, Earthjustice).

With the REAL rule, opposition groups were able to frame it as a ​“1,000+ page rule”, ​“regulation creep”, and as something that will make development financially infeasible. The opposition was able to frame this as something beyond sea level rise resilience, laden with DEP wish list items and nothing that actually could improve resiliency. Thus, municipalities saw this as overzealous, difficult to administer, and diminishing of development. While environmental groups attempted to reframe it as a public safety, climate resilience, and lifesaving policy, this partially worked but delays still occurred. Thus, the framing of the opposition dominated, and the resilience frame wasn’t enough for Governor Sherrill to defend the rule.

The reason why defenders cede frames is that the opposition is able to set the frame first. Because the opposition is announcing the change, defenders have to react, and by responding defenders have to accept the frame as legitimate debate. However, there is an alternative approach here. Following Open NY’s success with SEQRA, the goal isn’t to respond to opposition, it’s to show majority support and discard the opposition frame as minor. For example, ​“if having conversations with poorly informed opposition is about owning policy, you’re not going to win. But if talking about facts, the vast majority wants this, that’s a win” (Berkowitz, Open NY). The key here is that winners set their own frame and don’t engage the opposition. However, this requires either strong political power or polling proof that the majority supports your frame, which isn’t always a guarantee.

The lessons for RPA here are that frames are set early in the fight and whoever sets it first has the advantage. Defenders then have to accept the opposition’s terms if they respond to this opposition framing. Winners go past this and make their own frame when possible, not stumbling over opposition framing that has little tangible public support. This comes at some requirements though, either political power or polling power. Going forward, RPA should avoid the trap of responding to opposition on the opposition frame, and instead try to be the first to set the frame.

FINDING 4

The last major finding is that electoral politics and policy defense operate on different timelines. New Jersey League of Conservation Voters (NJLCV) electoral strategy paradox exemplifies this well.They saw the REAL rules as an important step in a fight to protect homes and critical buildings. However, NJLCV announced a $1.2 million dollar investment in the Sherrill election before it occurred. The issue here is that the timeline didn’t add up, whereby NJLCV invested in electing Sherrill predicting she would defend these environmental policies, but once elected she delayed REAL anyways. The response from NJLCV was limited here, whereby they expressed disappointment but they did not mount any real opposition. Now, there is work to be done with working groups in order to negotiate behind closed doors. Here NJLCV chose inside strategy, prioritizing a working group and an ongoing relationship building over outside strategy with public pressure and electoral threat. The result here is a loss of leverage to prevent delay further.

The fundamental challenge, however, was that environmental advocates spent considerable time and resources building the substantive case for their position, documenting the legal flaws, the procedural concerns, the unintended consequences. Yet the decision-maker (the Governor) was operating on an entirely different calculus. It wasn’t about the merits of the policy, but the political alignment of local Democratic elected officials. By the time advocates realized this mismatch, that technical arguments would not move the Governor, they scrambled to quickly mobilize local officials and mayors. The delay in recognizing this shift in political math proved costly, as did the compressed timeline to build that electoral pressure. The reason why the electoral strategy failed with environmental groups for SEQRA follows a similar vein. The youth Sunrise Movement endorsed Jumaane WIlliams over Hochul in 2022 for the democratic primary. The outcome though was a Hochul victory, who then went on to push SEQRA reform and CLCPA rollback. Here again the environment groups had very limited electoral power, and while they tried to use the primary as leverage it was ultimately something that couldn’t scale. One group mentioned that ​“the electoral part of the environmental movement is a little anemic in New York, that’s the reason lots of legislators aren’t afraid of us”(Food and Water Watch). The implication of this is that without ability to elect or defeat legislators at scale, electoral strategy is a threat without teeth.

Further, looking at the CLCPA we can see where litigation strategy failed. In October 2025, the Sierra Club won a court case forcing Hochul to implement an emissions cap and investment program, a tool mandated by the CLCPA to be implemented by…. However, in May 2026, Hochul used the budget process to weaken the law, ultimately circumventing the court order. ​“We weren’t expecting the strength of the Governor’s reaction, we expected we’d work out some timeline for the agency to put regulations forward, but it became clear that the government didn’t want to do it”(Rachel Spector, Earthjustice). Here there was a timeline problem, whereby the court battle took months and the governor responded in weeks via the budget. The key here is that litigation operates on a slow legal calendar and politics operates on a budget calendar with fast movement. The result here is that court victories do not equal political victories.

The lessons for RPA here are that electoral and legal strategies are necessary but not sufficient. The most effective strategy would coordinate multiple timelines of electoral threats, legal vulnerability, public pressure, and inside negotiations into one path forward. RPA here could help to work out these timelines, which would be more true to our mission.

1. How did other groups communicate about these policies?

2. What strategy actually moved policy?

3. What are the structural barriers to effective communication?

4. What external lessons apply to RPA?

QUESTION 1

How did other groups communicate about these policies?

The first question will look at the three policies and their broader communication arc through the phases and story of their policy.

I. CLCPA COMMUNICATION Stack (2019-2026)

Phase one of the CLCPA was the 2019 passage, and it exemplifies the coalition victory model. Here we can look at the NY Renews coalition strategy. The coalition was composed of over 300+ members, and its composition had great breadth in the groups a part of it. This meant that every demographic and geography had a trusted member in the community as a messenger. They used direct organizing of door knocking, rallies, and legislative testimony as well as media and constituent mobilization in order to get the public engaged with the topic. Their audience was both the public and legislators, resulting in an energized public and the passage of the law. In 2019-2025 though, we saw a different approach in this implementation phase. Here we got RPA lab posts that referenced the act, expert testimony, regulatory comments, and an expert to expert audience. Earthjustice focused on legal strategy with coordinated comments and permitting challenges, and did a lot more of the legislative work. The channels here shifted to regulatory filings, coalition coordination, and internal policy documents, with the audience being more state agencies, regulators, lawyers and informed advocates. The public however was largely left out of this.

In 2025 the defense phase started, with Sierra Club, Earthjustice and others using press releases on court victories in October and capitol protests in March to call attention to the cause that was largely on the backburner. Hochul countered this thought by traveling across the state and her affordability agenda, as was mentioned. This fractured the coalition and as a result the policy was weakened through the budget loophole. The coalition’s silence during implementation led to a public forgetting about the issue. The coalition lacked a pre planned defense strategy and the responses were reactive, and environmental groups detailed counter arguments lost to simplicity. Further, there was not much polling done which could have been a strength for the movement.

II. SEQRA: the Coalition Communication Model (January-May 2026)

Second, SEQRA shows us the coalition communication model being successful. With the January launch of the campaign fight, Open NY and RPA were able to announce that SEQRA was a 50 year old law creating bottlenecks. The branding of ​“unlocking NY’s future” was key here in building a strong face for the coalition. They used a joint message of housing and clean energy both being delayed by SEQRA, making for a strong case for reform that the public could relate to.

Beyond the messaging itself, a critical component of the campaign’s success was identifying and amplifying a process-oriented critique. While Open NY focused on housing affordability, other organizations like Riverkeeper found that messaging centered on democratic process also resonated strongly with policymakers and the public. Specifically, framing the Governor’s approach as ​“bypassing the legislative process and consolidating decisions among a small group of executives” proved effective, particularly as legislators began to recognize this centralization of power. This dual messaging, both on policy merits and on process, gave legislators political cover to support reform while maintaining their own institutional authority.

The second phase of coalition building from February through March was very powerful, growing to over 40+ organizations. Polling released to the public found 81% citywide support for this, and coalition members amplified through their own channels in a decentralized approach. Further, media engagement here was strong, with Op-Eds in LoHud, local news releases, social media content, and webinars. In the budget fight (April-May), the environmental opposition peaked early here with the capitol protest and the 70 legislator letter, but the coalition maintained its multi-channel pressure through news releases, polling, and member outreaches. This, alongside Hochul’s political capital, Mayor Mandani’s support, and the Governor’s budget power led to a strong victory for the coalition, which was afterwards celebrated by a victory statement from the coalition. The key communications here was that polling was used as a strong political weapon, concrete stories (of daycares and senior housing delays) were repeatedly told across channels, and the opposition framing was put aside for a focus more on political math to get this through. The coalition also stayed unified through the fight, and with the benefit of a compressed timeline was able to sustain as much pressure as possible.

III. REAL Rule: the adoption to delay arc (2024-2026)

The proposal and comments phase of the real rule (August 2024-November 2024) had strong initial showings. NJLCV held a press event in Asbury Park as well as conducted webinars with an overall goal of two tracks of language. Track one was a generic public focus, using simple language and hurricane connections. Track two focused on debunking misinformation (no-build zones, price skyrockets). Watershed focused on the educational outreach string of things, engaging at the municipality level and using technical analysis. New Jersey Builders Association (NJBA) stood in opposition however, with language of ​“regulation creep”, ​“costs”, and ​“financial infeasibility”. The result was 885 public comments, with environmental groups moving quickly. In July of 2025, the Rule hit its revision phase, whereby industry gained ground, the DEP revised and extended timelines, allowing for more flexibility with the rule. Watershed shifted from environmental protection to public health and cost benefit. During this, the misinformation fight continued, with environmental groups trying to debunk false claims, but this was hard to scale. January 20, 2026 was set as the implementation date, decided by the Murphy administration on their last day. The NJBA however filed an appeal and the counties filed several lawsuits as response.

In May, the delay announcement occurred, whereby the implementation was passed to one year from then. NJLCV responded with a private working group, but in the public eye there was minimal public opposition. Watershed group focused on municipal engagement, using cost-benefit framing. Overall, the industry commended the delay as a pathway to modifications. The key communications choices here were that environmental groups did a good two track public education proposal phase and chose behind the scenes negotiations rather than public defense during the delay. Here there was no sustained public campaign however to prevent delay and this is a strong example of coalition fatigue with the email campaign dropping off. A strong push about storytelling by groups like LCV about hurricanes definitely helped, and more engagement into developing a story could be useful in sustained public involvement.

QUESTION 2

What Strategies Actually Moved Policy?

This section analyzes mechanisms that work, drawing on the three cases. It is not an attempt to reprove the cases, but rather to extract the key tactical principles.

1. The winning formula (SEQRA)

Polling as political permission

• Polling is a strong resource for understanding and utilizing the public mind. For example, by finding that 81% of people supported the reform meant that legislators could say a majority of their constituents want this change. Especially when polls are released publicly, oppositions begin to look less intimidating as the majority goes up for the winning coalition. ​“You don’t need to engage opposition when 81% is on your side”(Berkowitz). The tactical lesson here is that polling is both great research as well as a political fact to help justify actions.

Concrete Stories

• Concrete stories are the key to connecting with the public and sticking in the public mind. For example, Open NY cited daycares being denied permits? for three years, senior housing being blocked, and 79 unit projects being delayed. They spent six months finding stories, hiring research assistants just for this task. Then, these stories were told repeatedly across videos, media, and through coalition member amplification. The tactical lesson is that one person’s tangible story will connect more with the public than 100 pages on policy analysis.

Coalition Breadth with Decentralized Amplification

• By having breadth in the coalition, messaging can both get to more members of the public, but also show policymakers that this is what diverse members of the public want. By having 39-40 organizations in the coalition, this meant that every legislator heard from someone in the district. Coalition members were able to speak through their own platforms (housing groups, transit, environmental allies), and avoided one center spokesperson. The tactical lesson here is that coalition scale and decentralization beats limited centralized messaging.

Reduce Entertainment of Opposition, Show political math

• Opposition, while important to engage with at some steps of the process, can oftentimes do more harm than good by platforming those groups when unneeded. Reformers never debated environmental groups substantive arguments here, instead they relied on polling data to know they had a strong case. The comparison here is that CLCPA defenders got into ​“do costs matter” debates and lost, whereas with SEQRA that debate didn’t even need to happen. The tactical lesson here is that high ground positioning in the majority beats defensive positions of correcting the opponent.

Political Champion

• Having a strong figure on your side, while not always possible, is an immediate way to help achieve success. Mayor Mamdani made SEQRA reform as part of his platform, helping to unify the Governor, legislature, and local officials into one voice. The tactical lesson is that one elected official’s public support goes further than many activists’ opposition.

Sustained Multi-Channel Campaigns

• Accelerating campaigns when needed is key to maintaining energy and pressure to get issues passed. This includes polling, coalition statements, op-eds, social media, webinars, and legislative pressure. The timeline mattered here, with budget windows closing the reformers accelerated campaigns to fit. The tactical lesson here is that saturation beats episodic opposition.

2. The patterns for improvement

CLCPA defense

• The CLCPA struggled in its strategy for a couple of reasons. First, litigation couldn’t overcome politics. Second, there was a timeline mismatch, whereby the slow legal calendar didn’t match the fast pace of the budget calendar. Third, technical rebuttals struggled against simple messaging. Fourth, the coalition fractured during the defense phase, with labor siding with ​“affordability”. Fifth, the public largely had no attachment to the law by 2026 due to the long stretch of silence about it. Finally, there was no front loaded defense strategy, it was largely reactive.

REAL rule defense

• While the real rule was initially a success, there was no political defense planned for. The strong two track public education was largely unsustained during the defense phase. Further, behind the scenes pressure was chosen over the public mind, when both are key to success. To continue, coalition fatigue struck with four to five rounds of mobilization occurring, and the public not meeting with the understanding of the stakes at play. Further, the electoral investment of $1.2M did not translate to policy outcomes. Finally, misinformation about complexity and costs wasn’t countered, rather it was just circulated.

Question 3

What structural barriers exist in preventing policy action?

Barrier 1: Electoral power deficit

• Environmental groups largely lack electoral leverage to make politicians fear losing elections. For example, Hochul ignored environmental opposition in the SEQRA fight, and knew legislators would lose votes. The comparison here is that housing groups have voter mobilization capacity whereas environmental groups don’t. This is a result of issue salience. These groups either have to build electoral capacity in the long term or ally with groups that have it.

Barrier 2: Coalition durability isn’t equal to coalition passage

• Passage requires excitement and energy, as we saw with the 2019 CLCPA. Defense requires rapid response and sustained vigilance as we saw with the 2026 CLCPA arc. The same coalition can’t do both without modifying the structure or commitment at play. Thus, SEQRA worked because the fight was short and didn’t need durability, just sustained intensity.

Barrier 3: Public Salience Shift

• When affordability becomes salient, environmental issues take a backburner. The public becomes largely worried about costs over the benefits in the long run. This opens a vulnerability for any environmental action to be branded as the cost problems, thus being a bad frame for environmental groups to defend on if the opponent is able to reframe issues into salient terms.

Barrier 4: Misinformation scales quicker than correction

• False claims are simpler and travel faster than corrections. For example, the real rule claims of ​“1,000 page regulation” stuck despite environmental rebuttals. With SEQRA, Open NY didn’t fight misinformation, they just made the opposition irrelevant, however in topics of slim margins, this doesn’t always work.

Question 4

What external lessons apply to RPA?

Short term (1-6 months)

• Identify political leverage point before communicating: Nick Berkowitz has a great way of framing this mentioning ​“what is the core of what needs to happen politically for policy to move”. For example, with SEQRA they knew they needed to show legislators that a silent majority supported this, and then went and designed a strategy around that. This helps with the avoiding of being on the defensive, and helps strengthen immediate direction from the jump.

• Using polling as a political weapon: Open NY saw huge success from polling, finding that the actions being done were largely supported by the public. They used this information publicly to assert positions. RPA, a strong research organization, could use polling more in the environmental fight to do the same. For major campaigns, commissioning polling strategically can help move that center piece discussed before. Further, releasing to the public early can set the frame.

• Concrete stories beat policy language: finding egregious examples and relying on personal testimony is a great way to bridge connections to the public mind. Finding a handful of solid examples, getting spokespeople from communities, and then repeating everywhere can help astronomically to develop public strength and strength of message.

• Preempt misinformation, don’t fight it: reactive debunking doesn’t scale. Instead, being ahead of potential opposition claims by pre-producing counter materials can help significantly. This prevents being dragged into extended debates and platforming opposition frames.

• Clarify inside vs. outside strategy. RPA’s role is largely as the expert and is inherently inside. However it can coordinate explicitly with outside members of coalitions to help orchestrate strategy and develop escalation plans. Both strategies are needed to achieve effective policy communication.

Medium term (6-24 months)

• Build public attachment during implementation: use social media as a strong tool for the long campaign fights (similar to Mamdani strategy). Don’t just celebrate wins, but educate the public continuously about policy through storytelling about successes along the way of implementation. By developing implementation phase communication strategy for every policy, and budgeting for ongoing public education, this can help significantly to keep the public attached. There should always be three parts to policy communication: passage mode, implementation mode, and defense mode.

• Goal setting: developing clean and clear goals and benchmarks on policy action is key to maintaining internal push for environmental policy. By having a robust goal setting system that tracks policy along the way and catches new policy when it arrives, RPA can have that jump on any sort of development. Further, incorporating goal setting specifically to CLCPA is a helpful step that can monitor its progress as well as use it in the best possible way.

• Hire when needed: As we saw with open NY, they hired staff to be research assistants to find stories about people in communities affected by policy. RPA could do the same, potentially hiring a specific environmental policy person, or polling and research staff as temporary workers. This is a cost dependent solution however.

Long term (1-3 years)

• Build translation infrastructure: building out toolkits for story development as well as public deliverables could be key in bridging the gap between RPA and the public mind. Templates can help streamline quick communication and might be the most cost effective way to address the public more.

• Explicit role differentiation on coalitions: RPA as a leader coalitions could work to delineate what each group specifically can do to divide resources. For example, one group with strong polling infrastructure could focus on that, another legal group could focus on legislation, and RPA could be the organizer, expert testimony, and behind the scenes coordination.

Within these narrative arcs, it is clear that RPA has done a lot of good in terms of being the expert in the field, providing strong reports, and giving support to the coalitions that win. RPA is also incredibly strong behind the scenes and in the negotiating room. There are spaces for improvement in terms of storytelling aspects and polling data with environmental policy specifically, yet are all achievable and reasonable room to grow. Connecting with the public mind is critical to any policy space, and the way in which this is done is ever changing, but drawing on skillsets from RPA and our broader coalition members, it is an achievable goal.