Building Better Streets

Using available data and a series of in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders inside and outside of government, this report investigates the current capital street infrastructure implementation process in NYC and builds on past and present efforts to improve project delivery. ​“Building Better Streets” identifies an actionable agenda for how to transform aspects of the current street infrastructure delivery process that are failing.

The proposed reforms are only part of what could be achieved with more consensus-building and political will. Other deeply embedded cost factors, such as limited firm competition, stringent work rules, long environmental review processes, and liability requirements (such as New York’s unique Scaffold Law) could potentially be reformed to achieve similar or even better health, safety, and environmental outcomes at a lower cost. Addressing these issues would be even more challenging than reforming the capital project delivery process, but the benefits could be greater as well.

Because of this expansive network, NYC’s street infrastructure is in constant need of repair and adaptation. The Department of Transportation deems 30.4% of the city’s roads to be in only ​“fair” or ​“poor” condition. Con Edison reports that as much as 2% of gas is leaked before it can make it into homes due to faulty pipes. And since 1998, there have been hundreds of water main breaks documented across the city each year. The NYC Streets Plan, issued in 2021, presents a blueprint for a more diversified, inclusive, and sustainable street network. The plan is an interpretation of a nationwide vision for ​“complete streets,” which are pedestrian- and cyclist-friendly streets that are safer for people of all ages and abilities. Visions like the Streets Plan are integral to the kind of transformation NYC streets require.

But this plan is only one piece of the puzzle. As articulated in RPA’s 2021 report ​“Re-envisioning the Right-of-Way,” to achieve a more comprehensive vision for street infrastructure, New York City needs to greatly increase investments in pedestrian, bike, and green infrastructure, and to transition from a car-oriented right-of-way that currently devotes 77% of surface area to auto-related uses to one that better serves pedestrians, micromobility, and multi-modal travel. To achieve this transformation, NYC needs to change the way that infrastructure is built, maintained, and governed.

Most wealthy, high-income regions have high land and personnel costs across all industries, which, to a large degree, are the result of high demand for the scarce amount of land in accessible locations and the education and skill levels of the workforce. New York in particular needs to pay higher salaries to compete with other regions that have lower costs of living, especially for housing.

In addition to these constraints, which apply to almost all infrastructure projects, the complexity of building in a densely packed, 24-hour metropolis with aging infrastructure is a particular problem for projects in the NYC right-of-way. To keep things running as smoothly as possible, the City, the MTA, and energy and communications utility companies go to great lengths to avoid interrupting service, damaging other infrastructure and buildings, and disturbing neighborhoods when they need to build or repair infrastructure. Taking these precautions makes construction take longer and cost more.

Inefficiencies in the project delivery process, which are the focus of this report, can result from outdated and overly complex government regulations and industry practices, overlapping responsibilities, slow adaptation of new technology, and sheer bureaucratic inertia. They often manifest in the amount of time it takes to plan, scope, budget, design, and build infrastructure projects. While few would argue with the need to eliminate project delivery inefficiencies, doing so requires reforming long-standing rules and practices that can be complex and resistant to change.

In addition to inefficiencies in the delivery process, City, State, and federal policies impose requirements on public agencies and regulated utilities that increase the cost of construction. Environmental review requirements at all three levels of government can add months or years—and considerable uncertainty—to project timelines. Laws requiring contractors working on public projects to pay a state-defined prevailing wage or policies that limit negotiations over work rules can add significantly to labor costs. Liability requirements add to insurance and legal costs. Limited competition in the industry also increases costs, and government bidding and contract requirements can sometimes make it harder for small or newer firms to compete, but also have the potential to make it easier by reducing the barriers to bid on government contracts that are particularly onerous for these firms.

Most of these policies are intended to protect the rights and wellbeing of those who live and work in the city, and New York has a well-earned record of protecting the environment, improving safety, ensuring fair wages, and minimizing the neighborhood impacts of construction. At the same time, however, the full costs of these policies are rarely measured and weighed against the actual benefits. This is partly because it is difficult to measure both costs and benefits, to put a financial value on health, safety, and the environment, or agree on what constitutes a fair wage or reasonable profit margin. But it is also because there is resistance from contractors, consultants, unions, neighborhood groups, and elected officials to upset the status quo.

While it is critical to act now to reform the project delivery process, it is just as important to begin to address these more difficult challenges. Greater industry transparency and further research is needed to provide an accurate account of costs and benefits, in order to build greater consensus and political will for change.

The Cost of Delays

The City, the MTA, state agencies, and private companies pour an estimated $7 billion in capital expenditures in New York City’s streets and subsurface infrastructure annually. This includes $2 billion by the City for roadways, bridges, water mains, and sewers, over $1 billion by the MTA for subway tracks, signals, power and stations, and nearly $4 billion in estimated expenditures by private utilities in electric power, natural gas, and communication infrastructure.

There is significant potential for efficiency savings in the right-of-way, as even the time and cost of permitting street construction takes a toll. According to data from the DOT, 5,864 segments of NYC’s estimated 32,000 total acres of streets were closed in 2021 for construction—nearly one in five streets over the course of the year. A 2017 Bloomberg article reports that NYC streets are dug up 200,000 times every year for repairs and construction, amounting to almost 550 digs per day. Standard DOT permits to dig up non-protected streets cost a minimum of $135 each. At the current rate, the process for acquiring DOT permits alone in order to dig in the right-of-way 200,000 times a year amounts to $270 million.

Extra time to account for delays is often built into a project’s schedule. To an extent, this is prudent project management, but it also obscures the degree to which inefficiencies are accepted as a ​“normal” part of the process. It should be noted that sometimes delays are necessary and can improve the quality or cost-effectiveness of a project with improved design or efficiencies. However, many delays add considerable time and cost to projects with little or no improvement in project outcomes.

The chart below shows projected timeline and budgets for select capital street infrastructure projects currently underway. Oftentimes, projects that are projected to take longer to complete (because they are larger projects or have been delayed or both) are also projected to cost more.

One reason that delays are so costly is because construction costs have historically risen faster than the general rate of inflation. From 2010 to 2022, the Turner Building Cost Index estimated that construction costs rose 62% — nearly twice as fast as the 34% increase in the U.S. Consumer Price Index. For public projects, these direct costs are almost always absorbed by the government agency sponsoring the project, either from contractor bid prices that factor in expected costs from delays, change orders, or direct agency costs.

Estimating the cost of delays is difficult because there is so much variation depending on the type of project, its location, and general economic conditions in the time period in which a project is implemented. However, available estimates indicate that these costs are substantial. A 2015 report by Common Good estimates that, on average, direct construction costs for national infrastructure projects increase by about 5% for every year that a project is delayed. A 2016 study by the Texas Transportation Institute funded by the U.S. Federal Highway Administration estimated that the cost for a typical freeway construction project in a large metropolitan area goes up by 1.3% for each month that the start of construction is delayed, the equivalent of about 15% annually.

Applying the more conservative estimate, it is reasonable to assume the cost of a capital project in New York City increases by at least 5% for each year of delay. This translates into $680 million for each year of delay in the City’s projected expenditures of $13.6 billion per year. A two-year reduction in the time it takes to deliver City projects, then, is the equivalent to savings of $1.4 billion per year for the City’s full capital plan, and approximately $300 million for City projects in the right-of-way. With every delay, public benefits and resources are also delayed — whether it is reliable transit, faster internet, new bike lanes, or other services.

While it is difficult to quantify just how much various shortcomings in project management contribute to lengthy project timelines, capital project data maintained by the City’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) offers some insights. Of the 990 right-of-way projects identified by RPA from the 2021-2025 capital commitment plan Project Detail Data, 717 were flagged as having either past or expected delays. Changes in scope and design account for only 14% of the delayed projects. However, as illustrated in the chart below, these projects also have the longest, most drawn out delays of all.

Furthermore, with every project that is delayed for repairs and maintenance, basic public safety is jeopardized. In March 2014, an explosion that resulted from a gas leak collapsed two buildings and killed eight people in East Harlem. Some of the faulty gas lines that require routine inspections are over 127 years old and are in desperate need of upgrades. This particular leak is believed to have been caused by a sinkhole that resulted from a ​“routine” water main break, which occur on a daily basis throughout the city. Without an efficient project delivery system in place, delays in street infrastructure maintenance don’t just cost time and money—they cost lives.

Stages of the Capital Delivery Process

Delays occur in all stages of the capital delivery process, and street infrastructure projects can face particular obstacles. Many of these delays are avoidable. The seven stages of the City’s process, illustrated in the flowchart below, offer a framework for understanding where and how these delays tend to emerge. Capital project delivery for non-City infrastructure belonging to the MTA, state and federal government, and private utilities differ in some ways that are not explored in detail in this report but nevertheless follow a similar progression from planning through close-out.

1. Fragmented Ownership and Responsibilities Among Government Agencies and Utility Companies

There is no single entity that owns or controls all the infrastructure in the right-of-way, resulting in a diffusion of responsibilities for building and maintaining it. The City’s Department of Transportation (DOT) is primarily responsible for the functioning and upkeep of the streets, including many bridges, road surfaces, and street furniture. Water, sewers, and green infrastructure, however, are managed by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), and street trees are managed by the Department of Parks and Recreation (Parks).

Other agencies, including the Police, Fire and Sanitation Departments who do not have much jurisdiction over the street infrastructure itself, offer services that keep the streets safe and clean. They also maintain stewardship over the right-of-way by providing permits and enforcement needed to carry out construction. For example, the DOT may call on the Police Department to remove illegally parked cars at a construction site or call upon the Department of Buildings to remove scaffolding that is obstructing the site.

Similarly, the Office of Technology and Innovation (OTI, formerly DOITT) does not own much infrastructure in the right-of-way, but it grants franchises (a license or contract permitting a particular operation or service) to private companies that provide communications and internet services. Another major entity is the MTA, which is responsible for station entrances on the street—not to mention the subway and bus transit services that operate on, above, and below the streets.

Underneath the surface, ownership and responsibilities over infrastructure can be equally complex. While the water and sewer systems are managed by DEP and the subways and commuter rails are managed by the MTA, all the other major underground infrastructure is owned and managed by private utilities: ConEdison and National Grid run steam, electricity, and gas while Verizon, Spectrum, and other telecommunications companies operate phone, cable, and internet service under franchises with the City and are regulated by the New York Public Service Commission.

Friction and lack of coordination are common both amongst City agencies and between the City and private infrastructure owners. The Department of Design and Construction (DDC), the City’s capital construction department, was created in 1996 to address some of the discordance between City agencies. At the time, the DOT and DEP struggled to coordinate their projects, leading to multiple, unnecessary digs that were costing the City time and money. DDC was to help consolidate and manage these large DOT and DEP street projects.DDC now executes infrastructure projects for over 20 sponsor agencies and, since its inception, has helped the City build thousands of capital projects, valued at over $20 billion.

In spite of this, discordance between City agencies remains a persistent problem. For example, during the design phase (the stage where DDC usually takes over the project) sponsoring agencies, and sometimes even non-sponsoring agencies, may send requests for scope changes, often resulting in conflicts between the sponsor agency’s desired design, DDC’s assessment of the project’s requirements, and OMB’s approved budget. Other interagency conflicts can involve disputes over project jurisdiction, use of city property, budget requirements, legal interpretations, the time it takes to get sign-offs for approvals, and other issues.

For some projects, the City has turned to public benefit corporations, such as the Economic Development Corporation (EDC), that are governed by Mayoral appointees but are not subject to the same project delivery regulations as City agencies. This means they can often deliver projects faster with less red tape. However, they do not own or operate the assets they work with and have no jurisdiction over any public space, including streets. So, while these non-profits help foster collaboration between the public and private sectors, they too have little ability to negotiate interagency dynamics in the right-of-way.

Fragmented jurisdiction over the right-of-way also makes it harder to resolve physical and logistical conflicts. Frequently, during construction, an unexpected pipe or other asset owned by a utility company presents an obstacle to the project. Negotiating removal or forcing removal of such obstructions takes time and money. For example, the MTA spent approximately $250 million relocating obstructive utilities to build the first phase of the Second Avenue Subway.

2. Outmoded and Siloed Data and Management Systems

One consequence of the multiple, siloed responsibilities amongst agencies in charge of the right-of-way is that data and information are also chronically siloed. Each agency and utility has developed its own data and project management system, each with their own nomenclatures, metrics and tracking protocols, and with their own update and maintenance schedules. This exacerbates the problems of project management, utility relocation, and coordinated street planning.

Perhaps the most critical gap is New York City’s lack of a single, comprehensive data system for its subsurface infrastructure. Because there is no centralized data management system for underground infrastructure, little is known about where many assets are located relative to other agencies’ and utility companies’ assets. One consequence of this disorganization is accidental strikes to underground infrastructure, which currently costs the city $300 million every year, as reported by Bloomberg.

According to Project Detail Data from the OMB, unforeseen site conditions are the cause of 34% of the reported delays for right-of-way projects. Combined with delays due to sudden changes in scope or design (which comprise 17% of reported delays), these add up to more than half of all reported project delays being attributed to some kind of unexpected change. Some of these unexpected changes are reflected during the project initiation and design phases from a lack of knowledge of site conditions. Other times, these conditions are not known until the construction phase and result in the project undergoing a change order and complete redesign.

In addition, government technology and technical capabilities are often outdated. Although there are efforts to digitize and update systems, a surprising amount of transactions and information storage are still done on paper. For example, during the procurement phase, New York State law requires submission of paper bids for contractors in most cases. Even where information is digitized, it is often published in a portable document format (PDF) and not in a data spreadsheet. Compared to spreadsheets, information in PDFs is not readily accessible for manipulation or analysis.

Data is collected by different agencies for different purposes, and rarely in a format or with sufficient detail that allows different sources to be aligned or compared. Based on interviews with staff in different City departments, this is not just a problem for outside analysts, legislators, or the public trying to evaluate the City’s performance in delivering its capital program. It also impedes managers and staff within City government from understanding and addressing bottlenecks, or even agreeing on basic measurements, such as how long it takes to complete tasks or process approvals.

Other outdated practices that impede capital project delivery and cause delays have less to do with outdated technology and more to do with outdated procedures. Systems and procedures are embedded in long-standing practices that are resistant to change. Both statutory and budgetary constraints make it exceedingly difficult to keep technology, workforce skills, and administrative rules up-to-date with the needs of a modern city.

When it comes to the procurement phase, for example, most capital infrastructure projects use the traditional design-bid-build method, which requires projects to be put out for bid at least twice: once for a design contract and later for a construction contract. This method still makes sense for smaller and relatively straightforward projects. However, this is no longer the global best practice for large, complex projects. Separating design and construction contracts can add a significant amount of time to the total length of the procurement phase.

More importantly, design-bid-build does not allow for the efficiency of an integrated team in which architects, engineers and construction managers can blend their expertise and more easily make needed course corrections during construction. Selecting contractors in this fashion can make projects more susceptible to problems and change orders during the construction phase. This, in turn, makes projects more costly and causes further delays.

3. Lack of Holistic Planning for a Re-envisioned Right-of-Way

The multidimensional nature of infrastructure systems in the right-of-way calls for a more holistic and innovative approach to project planning. A holistic approach is one that seamlessly integrates multiple infrastructure types and purposes. This is particularly true for much-needed but less prominent infrastructure types that are ill-suited to an auto-oriented street network, such as wider sidewalks, bikeways, express bus lanes, pedestrian plazas, and outdoor dining. All of these infrastructure types require space that is currently devoted to motor vehicle traffic and parking.

Furthermore, newer, more modern infrastructure types—such as bikeways, broadband, and green infrastructure—need to be layered on top of existing street infrastructure. These have their own unique set of project delivery challenges. Inefficient delivery processes for existing, traditional infrastructure can create bottlenecks in the delivery of these and other types of new, more modern infrastructure. Too narrow a vision for what street infrastructure could look like impedes innovative, symbiotic project design that could address multiple objectives. Bikeways, broadband, and green infrastructure are good examples of why we need to rethink the way we plan and deliver street infrastructure more holistically.

Bikeways include the full range of bike lane typologies found in the city today. They can be paved or unpaved, dedicated to bicycles or shared with other vehicles, protected or unprotected.

Broadband, delivered primarily along the street network, refers to technologies with a high capacity for transmitting large amounts of data, voice, and video at much higher speeds than ​“dial-up” services provided via copper telephone lines.

Green Infrastructure is defined by the 2019 Water Infrastructure Improvement Act as ​“the range of measures that use plant or soil systems, permeable pavement, or other permeable surfaces or substrates, stormwater harvest and reuse, or landscaping to store, infiltrate, or evapotranspirate stormwater and reduce flows to sewer systems or to surface waters.”

All of the issues cited above stand in the way of building the infrastructure needed for a more modern, multidimensional street network. This section offers several recommendations to improve the way we build, maintain, and govern this infrastructure. Some of these solutions pertain to all types of capital projects. Others are specific to the challenges of infrastructure projects within the right-of-way.

Recent Progress and a New Push for Reform

Improvements are being made at the federal, state, and city level to improve the capital infrastructure delivery process and reduce the time it takes to complete projects.

The Biden administration issued an Action Plan for Accelerating Infrastructure Projects in October 2022 following the passing of the $1.2 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) in 2021. The action plan touches on many of the same issue areas and recommendations raised in this report to expedite the infrastructure delivery process and use federal dollars to their fullest potential during the next five to seven years of rollout. The guide includes recommendations to support alternative delivery approaches, address the root causes of change orders, and implement more workforce training.

New York State and New York City have also made significant progress in the last few years. The MTA, which is officially a public benefit corporation run by the State, has made significant progress in implementing recommendations from a 2018 Board-Staff subcommittee to reduce red tape, improve project management, and improve partnerships with contractors. And at the city level, since 2019, the average time it takes to complete projects overseen by the DDC has decreased by 10%—mostly by improving front end planning and coordination, which has saved millions of taxpayer dollars in the process.

Most of the recommendations can be implemented by Mayor Adams and the agencies reporting to him under existing authority. A few of the recommendations would require City Council approval, and nine would require State legislation. Many of the specific task force proposals are referenced in the RPA recommendations below.

If fully implemented, the task force recommendations would substantially lower the time and cost to deliver public infrastructure projects in the city. With continued prioritization by the City, its partners in State government, and the private sector, the task force’s release could mark a turning point in the long effort to build the infrastructure that the city needs affordably, effectively, and efficiently. However, reform efforts launched by task forces and blue-ribbon commissions are notorious for failing to achieve their goals or live up to their original promises. Success will only be possible if other levels of government and the City’s private industry partners act in concert, and if the City sustains its commitment to continuous improvement.

The first four recommendations below are intended to help implement and build on the Capital Process Reform Task Force proposals and goals. Recommendations 5-8 are more specifically focused on the particular challenge of building multi-dimensional infrastructure in the street right-of-way.

Fixing the Capital Process Delivery Process

1. The New York State Legislature and Governor Hochul need to enact the legislative proposals made by Mayor Adams’ Capital Process Reform Task Force.

Numerous state laws constrain New York City’s ability to improve its capital delivery process. These restrictions range from preventing online submission of bids for city contracts to limiting the use of appropriate procurement and project management tools. Temporary authority granted by the New York State legislature in 2019 to use a single contract to procure a firm or team for design and construction under Design-Build (DB) shows what is possible when restrictions are loosened: Using DB, the Department of Design and Construction (DDC) estimates it will save $800 million on change orders alone and reduce project duration by an average of 2.1 years for 19 projects in its DB program.

In 2023, the Legislature and Governor should act on the nine legislative proposals made by the Capital Process Reform Task Force:

• Allow for construction contractors to submit bids electronically to expedite approvals.

• Give the City’s Procurement Policy Board the ability to change the current threshold that requires projects over $100,000 to have a public hearing in order to move smaller projects along faster.

• Increase the small purchase threshold for Minority/Women Business Enterprises (M/WBEs) to $1.5 million, as consistent with other public entities, to diversify eligible contractors and incentivize more M/WBEs to bid.

• Give New York City the authority to use Progressive Design-Build for contractor procurement, which would allow for collaboration between design and construction teams as a project is being scoped.

• Grant New York City the authority to use Construction Manager-Build and Construction Manager-at-Risk protocols to allow City agencies to hire a construction manager to procure and supervise construction.

• Create a pilot program in which contractors would have the option of using the New York State Insurance Fund to reduce high insurance costs.

• Allow the City to expand owner-controlled and contractor-controlled insurance programs already used by state agencies, such as the MTA, to achieve significant savings and expand M/WBE participation.

• Grant DDC the authority to bypass redundant oversight steps and outdated procurement regulations. Enabling legislation should ensure that this authority comes with adequate transparency, oversight, and criteria for projects that would be included in its portfolio.

2. The Mayor should set and measure performance on aggressive, multi-year targets that include faster and more cost-effective delivery of both public and private utility projects.

The Task Force has outlined an ambitious but achievable set of immediate objectives, and City Hall has committed to implementing them. This ongoing work will have a greater chance of success if they are guided by multi-year targets that are evaluated and updated annually. These goals should be measurable as well as ambitious enough to meet the scale and importance of the challenge. Regular public progress updates through the Mayor’s Management Report would provide transparency and accountability.

Goals for years beyond 2023 should include the following:

• Multi-year milestones for expanding and institutionalizing pilot projects and new initiatives

• Specific targets for reducing the time it takes to complete each phase of project delivery for different types of projects, in addition to average project times

• Developing and implementing a process for estimating the full life cycle return-on-investment for infrastructure projects, including operations and maintenance costs and environmental and equity benefits

More attention also needs to be given to coordination with private utilities and state agencies responsible for vital infrastructure that is not owned by the City of New York or under the control of the Mayor. The mission of the Task Force cannot be accomplished without active participation from—and collaboration with—state agencies, such as the MTA, the Public Service Commission, NYS Department of Transportation, and the private owners of electricity, gas, telecommunications, and internet services.

The Task Force recommends regular meetings between City Hall and private utilities to coordinate projects, but the problem is bigger than the coordination of individual projects. Systemic roadblocks to the delivery of non-City infrastructure also need to be addressed, and coordinated long-term planning between agencies and utilities would improve project delivery for both. Benchmarks should be established for improved delivery of private and State infrastructure, as well as City projects.

Consideration should also be given to a joint task force of the Governor’s and Mayor’s offices to address the full scope of infrastructure project delivery. Ideas could include examining the success that the MTA has had in reducing costs by directly funding utility relocation work and providing utilities and other contractors with a comprehensive roadmap for permit requirements and timelines. It could also include ways to improve ongoing staff level collaboration among agencies and utilities.

3. The Mayor and City Council should provide adequate funding, staff, and personnel training to develop the human capital needed to implement these reforms effectively.

Promising reform efforts often fail to be delivered because people who have to implement them don’t have the skills, tools, or incentives to carry them out. Operation budgets need sufficient funding. Civil service laws, human resource practices, and agency leadership need to be aligned to hire and train staff with the right skill sets. A skilled, knowledgeable, and well-prepared staff is essential to creating a workforce culture that encourages collaboration and innovation to navigate a complex and multifaceted capital project delivery process. Creating more in-house capacity can also help retain institutional knowledge over time, which is an important component of maintaining efficiency and quality.

An immediate need is to fill critical vacancies and retain the institutional knowledge that is needed both to reduce existing project backlogs and implement the reforms recommended by the Capital Process Reform Task Force. While the reforms will reduce paperwork and make the process more efficient, adequate staffing will still be essential to delivering projects on time and on budget. For some functions, increased staffing could result in long-term savings and better quality projects. For example, increasing in-house design capacity within departments could save on consultant costs and improve the integration of design and construction. It could also result in less friction between departments in front end planning and design, and build the City’s capacity to design better projects and better manage design consultants.

In addition to adequate staffing and equipping staff with the technical skills required to complete infrastructure-related tasks, much of the human capital reforms that are needed revolve around soft skills, including project management, organization, effective communication, and transparent engagement with multiple stakeholders, including communities. Leadership and human resource policies at both the city and departmental level will be critical to the change. Civil service laws and standards should also be examined and reformed to permit hiring the best candidates with the skills needed for available openings.

4. The Mayor’s Office should develop a unified system for tracking, analyzing and improving project delivery.

Capital project data and asset information are usually housed by projects’ managing agencies, and are not always shared with other agencies or on a public platform. Data is also not always detailed or updated accurately. This protocol makes it nearly impossible to identify and analyze precisely where bottlenecks occur in the capital delivery process and which systemic improvements are needed to improve it.

A new capital project tracker required by City Council Local Law 37 of 2020 and championed by City Comptroller Brad Lander is under development to address some of the shortcomings of capital project data. The proposed Capital Project Tracker would establish a single public online database to provide an updated schedule, cost, current project phase, and other information for all City-funded projects within the five boroughs.

However, in addition to providing the intended transparency for individual projects, the process of creating the tracker should also be used to unify and improve data systems to enable a much more thorough analysis of project delivery across City projects and facilitate continuous improvement.

To accomplish this, the system should include the following features:

• Consistent nomenclature and project identification numbers so information from managing agencies, the OMB, and the City Comptroller can be integrated and cross-referenced

• Geographic coordinates that would allow projects to be mapped and overlaid with the city’s land use, zoning, street network, and tax lot geodatabases

• Names of other projects or budget lines related to the project

• Up-to-date, accurate project milestones, including expected and actual start and end dates

• Clear, up-to-date reasons for delay or budget changes coded into detailed, standardized categories that permit analysis across agencies, project types, and geographies

• Data on completed projects as well as those currently in the City’s capital plan

• A comprehensive data glossary of all variables included in the dataset

• Annual analysis in the Mayor’s Management Report that identifies and tracks major causes of delay by project type and agency

• A forum to provide comment and a repository for public feedback

• An archive of formerly completed and canceled projects accessible on an as-needed basis for city agencies and other stakeholders to build upon institutional knowledge and learn from the successes and failures of past projects

Improving Collaboration for Building Multidimensional Infrastructure

5. The Mayor, with the collaboration of private utilities and the MTA, should complete three-dimensional mapping of underground infrastructure and develop protocols for information-sharing.

As described earlier in this report, there is currently no comprehensive map or database showing exactly where all the utility pipes and other underground infrastructure in New York City are located. Delays and cost overruns occur when construction crews encounter unidentified assets that need to be relocated or that trigger a need to rescope or redesign the project. Fortunately, there has been substantial progress in addressing this challenge in recent years. Technological advances in sensors and geographic information systems enable us to map and digitize the underground.

Concerted and increasingly coordinated efforts by government, private companies, universities, foundations, and other entities have laid the groundwork for creating a comprehensive database with protocols for sharing subsurface data. A federally-funded project led by New York University and the NYC Geospatial Information Systems and Mapping Organization (GISMO) called UNUM worked with a broad range of public and private sector partners and developed pilots in two New York City neighborhoods that laid the groundwork for a broader effort.

The New York City Mayor’s Office has applied for a grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development that will allow the City to take over the project. If fully funded and successfully implemented, this effort would result in a fully interoperable system for sharing data among city and state agencies (such as the MTA) and private utilities (such as Con Edison, National Grid, and Verizon), while protecting security, privacy, and proprietary information. By one conservative estimate, fully mapping the underground in this manner could reduce the costs of all construction that depends on these systems by 5%. It could also vastly improve the city’s ability to respond to emergencies and develop more effective climate resiliency, energy efficiency, and ​“smart city” applications.

Developing this tool should be a priority of the City, as well as the private utility companies and state agencies whose collaboration is needed and who will benefit from its development. As the project advances, potential users of the data should be included in the planning process to maximize its use for emergency management, city planning, and community engagement. While sensitive information needs to remain private and protected, a high-level version could be made more widely accessible and would be valuable for research, planning, and civic participation.

6. The Mayor’s Office should lead an effort that includes the Departments of Design and Construction, Transportation, and Environmental Protection, private utility companies, and the MTA to evaluate benefits and identify potential locations for future utility tunnels.

A long-term solution to subsurface infrastructure conflicts that would significantly reduce disruptive street construction is the implementation of multi-utility tunnels or ​“utilidors” (or a similar alternative, such as omnidors or bypasses). Utilidors are easily accessible underground conduits that house multiple types of utility transmission infrastructure that are buried in the subsurface soils, and that allow for the placement and ongoing maintenance of pipes and cables without digging up the street.

Utilidors would securely house private utility infrastructure (such as broadband, electricity, and gas) as well as public utility services (such as water mains and sewers). In addition to eliminating the need for excavations, utilidors would protect subsurface infrastructure from environmental degradation and protect each utility’s infrastructure from the infrastructure of other utilities. They also can optimize the use of subsurface space devoted to infrastructure in the densest parts of the city.

A rudimentary single utility system has existed in parts of Manhattan and the Bronx for some time. Under a franchise originally granted by the City of New York in 1891, the company that is now Verizon owns a subsidiary known as Empire City Subway which is responsible for 58 million feet of conduit rented to telecommunications and cable companies.

Implementing larger utilidors to cover a larger geography and more diverse types of infrastructure would be expensive and confront numerous legal and logistical challenges, but this type of investment can be undertaken in locations that are already undergoing extensive excavation for major street reconstructions, private utility service repairs, upgrades and extensions, or new subway lines.

A Smart City Utilidor working group within Town+Gown, a citywide built environmental research program resident in the Department of Design and Construction (DDC), has been working with various graduate student capstone teams within the city to explore the feasibility of utilidor implementation, including its long term costs and benefits. Research suggests that the long-term return on investment of utilidors outweighs the cost of the initial investment.

A logical next step for considering utilidor implementation would be to conduct a full feasibility study in one or more street corridors that have a high probability of yielding a high return on investment. If such a study confirms the academic findings, a pilot project could test run the life cycle benefit methodology that would have value for a range of infrastructure projects. They would also help develop the tools and interagency collaboration needed for broader applications.

7. The City’s new Chief Public Realm Officer should synthesize interdepartmental street planning efforts and promote multidimensional infrastructure.

In recent decades, the right-of-way has evolved to become an even more complex space that meets an increasing number of demands. As a result, the need for someone knowledgeable in the affairs of the public realm and empowered to work across agencies to take on a central position has also grown. Recognizing this, in 2023, the Mayor announced the creation of a new permanent, appointed position, Chief Public Realm Officer (CPRO).

As defined in the Executive Order that creates the position, the duties of the CPRO are to: “( a ) serve as a central point of contact for external partners that work with the City to improve public spaces; ( b ) lead inter-agency coordination and collaboration to advance policies and projects that improve public spaces throughout New York City; and ( c ) drive reform and innovation in the City’s public realm strategy to improve the user experience and pilot new ways to create beautiful, vibrant public spaces.”

As New York City plans the future of the public realm—which includes roadways, curbs, sidewalks, plazas, parks, and green space—this position should be used to synthesize planning for capital projects in the street right-of-way, as well as to engage and align DOT, DEP, OTI, DDC, utilities, and other entities that plan and implement projects for transportation, sustainability, water, energy, technology, and other infrastructural needs in the street. The Executive Order calls for all mayoral agencies to cooperate with the CPRO and to designate a liaison to work with the Officer.

One area where the CPRO could intercede is in the plans where the City and agencies lay out their planning, policy, and project goals. Currently, the DOT is charged with developing a new Streets Plan every five years, with goals and benchmarks for bus and bike lanes, bus stop upgrades, redesigned intersections, improved transit and pedestrian signaling, more pedestrian space, commercial loading zones, truck routes, and parking policy provisions.

At the same time, DEP issues an annual update on progress towards goals and new targets for its green infrastructure program. The citywide climate and sustainability plan (PlaNYC/OneNYC) also has its own targets for projects that might be carried out in the right-of-way, in addition to other agency-specific plans with goals and targets.

The CPRO should lead the effort to ensure that specific goals for projects in the right-of-way, such as those listed above, are coordinated among the agencies planning for them, and that specific shared benchmarks and goals for infrastructure that improve climate resilience, internet access, and equitable access to green space are developed together.

The current update to PlaNYC/OneNYC that is being carried out is an opportunity to develop these shared goals that could then be incorporated into individual agency plans (such as the Streets Plan). The CPRO should also work to ensure that all multi-agency planning efforts incorporate effective community engagement strategies, including educational workshops or presentations, public hearings, and surveys.

Synergies and conflicts in infrastructure priorities identified in the early stages of project planning by the CPRO would result in better alignment of infrastructure projects and more efficient project delivery. This can be particularly important for identifying projects that may not be the clear responsibility of a particular agency or that provide multiple benefits, such as the ​“smart pavers” described below.

8. Empower the Department of Transportation with greater ability to implement capital projects in the right-of-way

The vast majority of New York City’s public realm improvements over the past decade and a half have come about primarily through non-capital processes. From bike lanes, to public plazas, to the latest efforts around Open Streets, Seasonal Streets, and Open Restaurants, DOT has made the most out of surface paint, barricades, and reconfigured parking and travel lanes in ways that have transformed the city from an auto-dominated landscape to a global example of a pedestrian- and bike-friendly place. But to meet the demands for additional safe and conflict-free bike and pedestrian uses, more capitally constructed public realm projects will be needed, and with shorter timelines than are currently being achieved.

In order for the DOT to advance many of the projects that they have successfully planned for and will be planning in the future, it will need to be empowered with the ability to carry out more construction in-house. In particular, certain protected bike lanes could be implemented without going through the process of full street reconstruction, which is now carried out by DDC and involves more layers of complexity, larger budgets, and longer timelines.

Instead, with access to specialized contractors who can move catch basins, DOT could use its own staff to create raised bike lanes alongside the curbs of certain streets with asphalt and barricades. With the additional staff and budget called for in this report, and in partnership with the CPRO, DOT could implement new bike lanes and other similar public realm projects quickly and efficiently, meeting the demand of an increasingly bike-focused and pedestrian city.