A Preventable Crisis

The aging Trans-Hudson rail tunnel is a key part of the network of interdependent tunnels, bridges, highways, subways, ferries and airports that serves the most densely populated core of the Northeast. Just as a recent shutdown of LaGuardia Airport caused flights to be cancelled as far away as Atlanta and Chicago, the all-too-frequent disruptions in New Jersey Transit and Amtrak service contribute to traffic jams at the Lincoln and Holland Tunnel and congestion on the I-95 Interstate highway.

As frustrating and costly as these service interruptions are already, they would become far worse in the event of a tunnel shutdown. Even before Sandy, transportation agencies and planners have long known that additional capacity was needed to handle growing passenger volumes and to make it easier to reroute service, and have spent years developing and promoting plans for a new tunnel that would double train capacity and provide vastly expanded service. New Jersey Transit’s Access to the Region’s Core (ARC) project was nearly approved in 2010, and Amtrak’s proposed Gateway project has received initial funding and has the strong support of New York’s and New Jersey’s transportation agencies and political and business leaders.

This report looks at the impacts of a potential partial shutdown of the Hudson River rail tunnel.

While a shutdown is not planned right now, the possibility is becoming increasingly likely.

Amtrak, which owns the existing tunnel, is maintaining the tunnel to ensure safe operations following the damage from Superstorm Sandy. But eventually, each tube of the tunnel will need to be taken out of service for an estimated two years at a time. In a best case scenario, this can be deferred until new tunnels are built. However, there is a real possibility that the condition of the tubes will deteriorate to the point where they need to be closed before new service is on line, especially if funding and approvals are delayed or denied. In a worst case scenario, an intense storm or other calamity would cause an emergency shutdown with little or no time to prepare. At a minimum, we are likely to see an ever increasing number of unplanned outages such as the failure of power cables in the summer of 2015, triggering temporary but multiple impacts similar to those described in this report.

This report takes a rigorous look at what would be likely to happen if one of the two tracks needs to be taken out of service before a new tunnel is built. It examines both the human and economic toll that it would take, and not just on those who rely on trains to get in and out of New York City. It shows how the ripple effect of a tunnel closure will affect hundreds of thousands of individuals and tens of thousands of businesses, from New Jersey homeowners to Pennsylvania trucking companies to air passengers living in Virginia or Maryland. It breaks down the costs in terms of time, wages, productivity, travel costs, property values and health and safety.

It is hoped that this report will contribute to a rational discussion of what is perhaps the most serious infrastructure problem in the United States today.

People traveling to work in the New York metropolitan region, which includes two-thirds of New Jersey and parts of Connecticut and Pennsylvania, already have the longest commutes in the United States. And they are getting longer. The number of people and jobs has outgrown a transportation system that was largely built in the early and mid-20^th century, and decades of underinvestment have led to disrepair and deteriorating service.

A partial closure of the Hudson River tubes would remove a critical link in the region’s transportation network, putting more people on other types of transit and more cars on the already congested roads, bridges and tunnels. While there is enough room to absorb these diverted passengers at most hours of the day, there is little space for them during rush hours. This analysis looks at the 7-10 AM morning peak period when most people are trying to get to work. It shows what is likely to happen if one of the two tubes of the Hudson River tunnel is closed over a period of four years and passengers divert to the region’s existing infrastructure and transportation services.

Because there is so little capacity in the transportation network at rush hour, even small numbers of additional passengers or cars can have big impacts on everyone who uses these services. For some, the effects will be relatively small, adding several minutes and more uncertainty to the trip they are making today. For many, however, commuting times could increase by more than an hour, force them to take other means of transportation, and cause major disruptions in work and family life.

Today, some 67,000 people take New Jersey Transit trains to get to work in New York City in the morning. As shown in the chart below and discussed in the detailed supplement to this report, there will only be enough room for 29,000 of these commuters during a shutdown, leaving 38,000 who need to find a different way to get to work. There is room for about 20-25,000 to take another form of transit—and it is expected that a little more than half of those who are able would take a PATH train and the rest would take a bus or ferry. Many of these diverted transit riders will need to travel early or later than they do now, and most would have longer, more crowded commutes.

Of the remaining 15,000, about 10-12,000 would be expected to drive because there just isn’t enough room on transit to allow them to get to work on time. For these workers, driving would introduce a major change to their commute. Instead of sitting on a train where they could work or rest, they would spend as much as two or more hours behind the wheel, much of it in heavy traffic, and bear the costs of parking, gas and tolls and auto maintenance.

Because the roads are so crowded at rush hour already, even these few thousand additional drivers will cause major delays at certain points, particularly the approaches to the Lincoln and Holland tunnels and George Washington Bridge. In fact, an estimated 245,000 drivers would be likely to see their commutes increased by 10 minutes or more. 135-140,000 of these drivers would see their commutes increase by at least 30 minutes, and of these approximately 100,000 would have to travel more than an hour longer.

Even people who don’t have to get into Manhattan will experience major delays because of this congestion. About one of every four commuters who will be delayed at least 20 minutes are travelling to destinations outside of New York City, most to locations in northern New Jersey.

This would still leave about 3-4,000 people who wouldn’t make the trip at all. At first, most of these would work from home. Not everyone has that option, but there would certainly be more who would do so if they can. But since they are not choosing to do this today, it’s safe to assume that this is not their preferred option. Over time, most of these workers would likely move or get a different job, often at a lower wage.

In monetary terms, the costs of these changes and delays are estimated to cost nearly $13 billion over four years. About $9 billion would be the equivalent of wages for the amount of extra time people would be commuting. Nearly $1 billion would be for parking and other auto related costs. Over $2 billion would be for additional delays that can be expected whenever there is bad weather or other disruptions. With more people driving and more on PATH, buses and ferries, there is less flexibility to accommodate frequently occurring disruptions, creating more delay than there would be otherwise.

In human terms, this would take a significant toll on the work, personal and family life of thousands of people. Two typical examples of how this would affect commutes and lives are illustrated here. While these are not actual people, their stories are representative of thousands of individuals in similar circumstances.

The northeastern United States is the most densely populated and economically productive part of the country, accounting for one-fifth of the national economy. Being able to travel between cities in the Northeast—New York, Baltimore, Wilmington, Philadelphia, Newark, New York, New Haven, Providence and Boston within hours by air, rail, bus or car gives these metropolitan economies an advantage that helps them compete with similarly connected regions in Europe and Asia. Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor service provides an option preferred by many business and leisure travelers, allowing comfortable trips directly into city centers. Without intercity rail, air fares would be higher, airports would be more crowded, and roadways, particularly Interstate 95 (I-95), would be more congested.

A tunnel shutdown would have little impact on New York to Boston service, but could cut service in half between Washington and New York. Today, Amtrak’s Acela and regional trains transport 22,000 passengers between Washington and New York daily. This analysis assumes the Amtrak service would be cut from two trains per hour to one in the event of a partial tunnel shutdown. Although it would be possible to maintain both hourly trains, this would further curtail the already limited NJT service described above.

This reduced service would only have capacity for 14,000 passengers per day. For the remaining 6,000, some would drive or take the bus, and some leisure travelers would choose not to travel. But the largest group—business travelers going between Washington or Baltimore and New York, would likely fly instead. The New York region’s airports—LaGuardia, Kennedy and Newark—already suffer from some of the longest delays in the U.S. Because of this, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has capped the number of flights that can arrive or depart from these airports. So diverted Amtrak passengers who want to fly at peak periods would have to get tickets on the limited number of remaining seats.

This additional demand for seats would likely induce airlines to raise airfares, potentially by as much as 65% between Washington and New York’s airports at peak times, and could double prices between Baltimore and New York. This means that those least able or willing to pay would stay home. Most business travelers would pay the price, but many leisure travelers, small business owners or non-profit employees would not. The costs from both increased ticket prices and lost economic activity from those who don’t travel would total an estimated $1.7 billion. The state with that would feel the largest impact is New York, but New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia and Connecticut residents and businesses would also have significant costs.

Moving goods from producers to distribution centers to consumers is an essential function of the transportation network. Most of the freight in the region is transported by truck, a condition that is compounded by the region’s limited rail freight network. Whether food, furniture or pharmaceuticals, most of the goods traveling in the region are destined for consumers in this large metropolitan area, and the costs of shipping them are largely passed on to these consumers.

The logistics chain for transporting goods is even more complicated and covers a wider area than the labor market within which people commute to work. Most goods that are consumed here are shipped in from other parts of the country or the world by ship, plane, train or truck, and much of what is produced here is shipped out to consumers elsewhere. Along the way, most freight is stored in one or more warehouse or distribution center until it is ready to be shipped to a retail store or consumer. While the ports of entry are concentrated in the core of the region—seaports in Newark, Elizabeth, Staten Island and elsewhere and airports, especially Kennedy and Newark, distribution centers are often located in central or south New Jersey, upstate New York, Long Island and Pennsylvania where land is cheaper.

The highway congestion that would be caused by a tunnel shutdown would affect the time and cost of delivering goods as well as moving people. Regional trucks make 147,000 daily trips in the region, and the extra traffic could make their trips 1.5% longer, on average. Delays getting in and out of the region’s ports and airports, where many trucks originate from or are destined for, could be nearly three times the regional average. These trucks carry $450 billion worth of goods, and the added costs of delay could cost the economy over $1 billion.

The physical and mental stress of more difficult and less predictable commutes and intercity travel would have a negative impact on public health. While the health impacts of stress are well documented, it is difficult to calculate the specific impacts that would result from a tunnel shutdown. By contrast, there is accepted methodology for estimating the increase in vehicle accidents and air pollution that would result from increased highway congestion, and how these would result in injuries, illnesses and premature deaths.

Over the four years of the shutdown, just having more cars travelling more miles on the road would lead to approximately 38,000 more auto crashes. The large majority of these would result only in personal property damage, but about 9,000 would cause injuries and result in 80-90 fatalities.

The environmental damage from increased air pollution will affect the health of people throughout the region, whether they drive or not. There would be about two million additional tons of carbon dioxide (CO₂) in the atmosphere, the equivalent of 2.6 million people flying between New York and San Francisco. Other pollutants (NOx and PM 2.5) would have a more immediate impact on health resulting in nearly 600 lost work days and approximately 10 premature deaths.

When combined, these health and safety impacts represent a cost of approximately $550 million.

The cumulative effect of longer commutes and declining home values could affect thousands of residents. 80 people commute from eastern Monmouth County to East Rutherford each morning. Their trip could be over 30 minutes longer each way, causing them to leave early and incur more in child and elder care expenses. The average home value could decrease by $23,000 and municipal budgets might have to be scaled back by as much as 25%.